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Introduction

In recent decades, it has seemed as though queer people and women’s rights advocates were
making progress in the culture war over the family. From 2001 and 2021, thirty-one countries
legalized marriage for same-sex couples.1 Majorities in the United States and European Union
countries came to support same-sex marriage and other fundamental rights for LGBTQ+ families.2
Although some variation remains, divorce is now relatively easy to attain in most Western nations
around the world.3 Parentage and custody rights for same-sex couples are increasingly the norm in
Western democracies.4

Yet, despite this growing support for pluralistic family forms, divisions remain, and, in many
countries, legal victories for religious conservatives threaten to scale back progress for women and
sexual minorities. For example, in 2018, the United States Supreme Court decided Masterpiece
Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission5 in favor of a baker who refused service to a samesex couple because of the baker’s religious beliefs. In the past seven years, three politically
motivated lawsuits challenging the Affordable Care Act’s contraception mandate6 on religious and
moral grounds landed in the Supreme Court.7 In 2021, the Court sided with a Catholic adoption
agency that refused to work with LGBTQ couples.8 Women’s and girls’ right to terminate a
pregnancy, even before viability and even in cases of rape or incest, is in peril, with the Supreme
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Court deciding to sit by and watch for months as Texas, the country’s second-largest state, passed
a law criminalizing abortion and effectively rendering Roe v. Wade a dead letter.9 With a new
supermajority on the Supreme Court since 2020, social conservatives in the United States have
pressed forward with a sweeping set of religious exemptions from public services and
nondiscrimination laws that threaten to turn respect for group differences into a license to
discriminate.10 And these recent attacks go well beyond the conservatives’ bread and butter issues
of abortion and “the family”—as evidenced by pandemic-era religious freedom challenges to even
basic public health measures such as mask mandates, immunizations, and restrictions on large
gatherings.11 That is, despite increased acceptance of pluralistic family forms, it seems that the
United States is suddenly awash in a tide of religiosity. Against this backdrop, the question posed
by this volume about the possibility of religious and secular alliances to recognize diverse family
forms seems more pressing than ever.

This chapter will use the country of Israel as a window into this issue. While Israel may at first
blush appear to be the last place that feminists and queer theorists should look for solutions to
modern conflicts between democratic and religious values, this chapter argues that the Israeli
experience has much to offer critical family scholars working to develop pluralistic legal
approaches to family regulation. Israel is a country with a diverse population and unique political
and legal context that has generated a rich (if imperfect) set of compromises among its religious,
secular, and ethnic populations in the realm of family law. These solutions have emerged despite
—or perhaps because of—Israel’s lack of a written constitution guaranteeing its citizens a basic
right to equality. Moreover, women’s and gay rights activism are highly developed in Israel. As
such, Israel serves as a potentially generative case study to examine the possibility of developing
2
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pluralistic legal responses to family regulation, particularly in contexts without robust, universal,
constitutional protections for women and LGBTQ citizens, a circumstance that the United States
seems to be approaching.

At the most immediate level, then, this chapter examines the legal structure of Israel’s system of
personal status12 (family) law, the conflicts between religious and secular approaches to family
law that have emerged, and how they have been resolved in practice. The primary example that
will be examined is Israeli divorce law. The task confronting Israel on the issue of divorce is
formidable, since Israel did not adopt a written constitution upon its founding and maintains the
rule of religious legal control over marriage and divorce.13 That is, at least formally, there is no
separation of church and state in Israel on matters of family law, particularly marriage and divorce.
Nor is there a robust constitutional right to equality.14 Because of this unique legal context, the
development of marriage equality for same-sex couples and no-fault divorce—two core features
of modern family law regimes in most Western states—have not emerged in Israel.

Yet, in the face of legal and political constraints presented by Israel’s constitutional context, the
country has developed several legal workarounds and creative responses to religious authorities’
control over marriage and divorce that are consistent with secular principles of equality and
freedom. Moreover, at times, religious courts and law have been a source of liberalization of family
law in Israel. Taken together, these secular and religious legal innovations have produced a fair
degree of autonomy, choice, and legal recognition for those choosing to live outside the traditional
marital family, at least more than one would expect given religious control of marriage and divorce
in Israel. It is this legal pluralism, suppleness, and flexibility in Israeli family law that is my main
3
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focus in this chapter. My claim is that an examination of Israeli family law may reveal matters of
enduring theoretical and practical significance regarding potential pluralistic legal approaches to
the family.

I begin by focusing on recent developments in the religious law of divorce in Israel, starting with
an explanation of Israel’s personal status system and the Jewish and Sharī‘a laws on divorce. After
mapping the basics of personal status law, I examine a recent decision by a private rabbinical court
to grant an annulment to a woman trapped in a dangerous marriage because her abusive husband
of twenty years refused to grant a divorce, as well as a recent change in position of the Sharī‘a
Court in Israel paving the way for the appointment of the first female qadi or judge. The chapter
concludes with a broader consideration of the implications of the Israeli experience for the United
States. In particular, I suggest that the Israeli experience helps to illuminate conditions that may
incentivize cooperation between religious and queer/feminist/secular communities around issues
of family diversity absent strong constitutional protections for family equality. It also suggests
how American reformers might facilitate greater legal pluralism to address queer families’ legal
needs through private dispute resolution or other mechanisms that are less dependent on the state
for their validity and enforcement than constitutional rights litigation.

Israeli Personal Status Law
Israel is a small country that maintains a system of personal status that it inherited from the
Ottomans and the British.15 Like the law of other countries that inherited plural personal status
systems from their imperial or colonial predecessors,16 Israeli law imposes certain restrictions and
disabilities on women, LGBTQ+ individuals, and non-religious people in matters of marriage and
4

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4048481

DRAFT – 1/9/22

divorce. For example, Jewish divorce law in Israel adopts sex-based rules that limit women’s exit
from marriage and empowers men to extract financial compromises in divorce. Many categories
of citizens may not legally marry in Israel, including same-sex couples. Others are effectively
prevented from marrying because the country’s personal status laws apply differently to each
officially recognized religious group; for example, interreligious marriages are practically
impossible in Israel.17 A multitude of humanitarian harms and logistical complications18 result
from this system.19

These humanitarian violations are rooted in Israel’s special form of legal pluralism characterized
by the jurisdictional split between religious and civil courts on matters of personal status. In this
system, state-sanctioned20 religious courts have exclusive jurisdiction in matters of marriage and
divorce. All other ancillary matters related to divorce disputes, such as child custody, child support,
spousal support, and property claims, fall under the concurrent jurisdiction of both the civil and
religious courts.21 This jurisdictional split means that all Jews in Israel, whether religious or
secular, can be divorced only in the rabbinical courts, which apply religious law. Along the same
lines, all Muslims in Israel, whether religious or secular, can be divorced only in Sharī‘a (Islamic)
courts, which apply Sharī‘a law. Christians have their own courts as well, and so on. Religious
tribunals apply religious rules of procedure and evidence and generally ignore substantive civil
law, despite efforts of the Supreme Court at various points in Israel’s history to direct religious
courts to bring religious legal doctrines more in line with principles of civil law.22

5
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Women Under Israeli Personal Status Law
Because religious courts in Israel follow traditional, patriarchal, and heterosexist norms, and, like
most religious institutions, have as one of their principal aims the control of women by men,23 the
law of marriage and divorce in Israel rests on a system of explicit sex-based classifications holding
men and women to different and unequal legal standards. As Israeli family law expert Zvi Triger
explains, “all Israeli family laws discriminate against women.”24

A central component of Jewish law is the doctrine that a woman may not obtain a divorce without
her husband’s permission. This is accomplished when the husband gives the wife a get or Jewish
divorce decree.25 With few exceptions,26 a husband’s power to refuse a divorce is retained even if
the wife can prove egregious fault grounds such as domestic violence.27 A woman whose husband
refuses a divorce is known as an agunah, which in Hebrew means a “chained woman.”28

The potential consequences for married women under this sex-based system are grave. Until a
consensual transfer of a get from the husband to the wife and her consensual receipt of it take
place, the marriage is not dissolved, and the wife cannot remarry under Jewish law.29 If she
cohabits with another person or obtains a civil divorce in another country and thereupon remarries,
there are harsh legal, economic, and religious consequences for both her and any children born
outside of the marriage.30 These consequences serve as a strong deterrent to forming new
relationships and to seeking a divorce in the first instance and have no equal with regard to men.
Due to the power imbalance created by Jewish divorce law, blackmail and extortion are a routine
part of divorce negotiations in Israel.31 The problem of the agunah in Israel is not simply one
experienced by Orthodox Jewish women; even secular Jewish couples who marry civilly outside
6
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of Israel will find themselves stuck in this Kafkaesque system in the event of divorce if they
register their marriages in the country.32

Palestinian Muslim women are in an even worse position than Jewish women under Israel’s
religiously-dominated family law system.33 They face double discrimination, first as women living
in a traditional, patriarchal culture, and second, as religious and ethnic minorities in a Jewish
state.34 Sharī‘a courts have exclusive jurisdiction over marriage and divorce for Muslim citizens
of Israel,35 just as rabbinical courts hold exclusive jurisdiction over marriage and divorce for
Jewish Israelis.36 In 2001, a jurisdictional reform of the Sharī‘a courts granted civil family law
courts concurrent jurisdiction in matters of paternity, spousal, and child support, thereby, in theory,
providing Muslim women with a civil avenue to adjudicate at least some legal issues in their
divorces. 37 However, this has not improved the situation for Muslim women as much as concurrent
jurisdiction has benefitted Jewish women. Religious, social, linguistic, cultural, and national
inhibitions continue to impede access to civil family courts, especially when there is an option to
litigate a divorce in a Sharī‘a court, which is likely to be more familiar, comfortable, and congenial
for Palestinian Israelis.38

Like Jewish personal status law, Sharī‘a law elevates the husband’s position over the wife’s in
divorce. A wife may obtain a divorce only through a judicial decree, and only if her marriage
contract provides for this option, and, in any event, only on limited grounds, such as his failure to
support her or the husband’s marriage to another woman.39 And to achieve even this, she must
typically withstand a long and burdensome fault-based divorce process, one which involves

7

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4048481

DRAFT – 1/9/22

placing the marital relationship under a microscope by the court and a council of lay arbitrators
selected from the couples’ families.40

Religious control over marriage and divorce in Israel emerged out of Israel’s unique post-colonial
history. And it has persisted due to Israel’s unique geopolitical circumstances, as if frozen in time,
for more than half a century, while the rest of the world moved on.41 If we ended the story here, it
might seem to be a tragic but simple story. But instead, the story gets more interesting, and a little
less tragic.

Civil Workarounds and Marriage Alternatives
In the context of this religious control over marriage and divorce in Israel, a number of civil legal
workarounds and functional alternatives to traditional marriage and divorce have developed. First,
couples can marry civilly outside of Israel and then register their marriage in Israel; such
registration confers benefits (and obligations) equivalent to an official Israeli marriage license.42
Second, Israel is one of the most progressive Western countries with respect to recognizing legal
rights and obligations of partners without formal marital ties.43 “Reputed spouses” (yedu’im betzibur) are afforded a wide range of rights that are almost identical to the rights enjoyed by married
couples, including third-party rights such as social security disability and death benefits.44 As a
result of civil rights litigation, same-sex couples enjoy the same opportunity to achieve the status
of reputed spouses as heterosexual couples in Israel.45

The ability to cohabit while enjoying basically all the rights of a married couple in Israel allows
Israeli citizens who cannot legally marry—there are many categories of such couples46—or who
8
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object on ideological grounds to religious authorities’ control of marriage, to entirely circumvent
the institution of formal marriage.47

Progressive Interpretations of Religious Law by Religious Authorities and Courts
Israeli religious courts have developed innovative interpretations of religious law to (at least
modestly) even the divorce playing field for women in Israel. The result has been some notable
revisions of religious doctrine. I will briefly touch on two recent examples: the development of a
doctrine permitting annulments of dead marriages by rabbinical courts and the progressive
interpretation of Sharī‘a law allowing the appointment of female qadis as family law judges in the
Sharī‘a court in Israel.

Hafka’at Kiddushin: The new kosher “divorce”
Recently, a rabbinical court found a textual basis in Jewish law to annul a marriage where a
husband refused to grant a bill of divorce for an extended period. Zvia Gordetsky requested a
divorce from her husband in 1995 due to his violent and abusive behavior toward her, which
included beating her while she was pregnant, which caused a miscarriage when she was near fullterm, and throwing acid on her.48 Gordetsky’s husband stubbornly and unfalteringly refused to
grant a get for almost twenty years. Gordetsky’s made her situation a public cause, going on two
hunger strikes and protesting in front of the Knesset, which was covered in the media.49 Finally,
in 2018, with the assistance of a women’s rights legal organization and its pathbreaking legal
founder Susan Weiss, a more centrist rabbi was enlisted to convene a second, private panel of
Orthodox rabbis, and Gordetsky was freed from her abusive marriage.50

9
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To achieve this outcome, the rabbinical panel invoked an ancient Talmudic legal doctrine known
as hafka’at kiddushin or annulment of a marriage. Traditionally, the application of this doctrine
was limited to a narrow set of circumstances mainly concerning repellent bodily conditions making
cohabitation (and, in essence, procreation) impossible.51 However, in 1969, a broader
interpretation emerged out of the Conservative movement in the United States that authorized
application of the doctrine where it is clear that a husband will never agree to give a get, among
other modern circumstances.52 Although the Chief Rabbinate of Israel, which oversees the
rabbinical courts and Jewish personal status law in Israel, will not follow this more progressive
interpretation, the private rabbinical panel convened at the urging of Gordetsky’s lawyer agreed to
follow it. Satisfied that she won her battle, Gordetsky withdrew her request with the official Israeli
Rabbinate for a get.53

Women’s rights advocates point out that hafka’at kiddushin is still not officially recognized by the
Beit Din or routinely granted in Israel. Moreover, when rabbinic authorities use Jewish legal
(halachic) remedies to free an agunah, “they do so in ways that assure such action is not easily
replicated.”54 Still, the recent annulment cases suggest the ways that organic, religious responses
to the agunah problem in Israel might yet develop, as well as the potential for partnership between
religious courts and civil authorities on this matter, however insufficient and complex.

Israel’s first female qadi: Internal reform of the Israeli sharī‘a court
A second example of the role of religious authorities and institutions in developing progressive
interpretations of religious law to address the injustices of religious divorce law in Israel is the
appointment of the first female qadi in the Israel Sharī‘a Court.55 For decades, the Sharī‘a courts
10
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in Israel opposed the appointment of female judges, even though female qadis serve in the Sharī‘a
courts of many majority Muslim countries, including Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Egypt,56 and
Jordan, as well as in the West Bank under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority.57

As early as the 1990s, a coalition of Israeli women’s organizations, the Working Group for
Equality in the Personal Status Law, began advocating for the appointment of female Islamic court
judges in Israel. There was not much progress on this issue until the Palestinian Authority
permitted its first female qadi in 2009,58 which reenergized the cause. From 2013 to 2015, Jewish
feminist and Muslim voices from within the Justice Ministry and Knesset were added to the
campaign through a series of negotiations and a legislative bill,59 which, although formally
unsuccessful, brought enough attention to the issue for the Sharī‘a court to reconsider its position.
Ultimately, the court found a basis in Sharī‘a law, particularly a Hanafi school ruling permitting
women to be judges and the writings of jurist Ibn Jarir al-Tabari. In its official statement
announcing its decision, the court explained that while it was “fully aware of the doctrinal dispute
on the matter,” it was bound by the Hanafi school “like other Islamic countries surrounding us,”
which have “preceded us by appointing women to the post of sharia justice, as did the Palestinian
Authority.”60 In April 2017, the Israeli Justice Minister appointed Hana Mansour-Khatib, an
attorney and mediator specializing in Sharī‘a and personal status law, to the Sharī‘a court in
Israel.61

Although historic, the appointment of Israel’s first female qadi is a bittersweet achievement.
Whether representation of women on the Israeli Sharī‘a court bench will make a difference in the
court’s divorce decisions or the liberalization of Sharī‘a family law is an open question,62 a concern
11
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acknowledged even by Judge Khatib, Israel’s first female qadi.63 Moreover, this development
reveals the anomalous and subordinated position of the Sharī‘a courts in Israel, however
potentially positive from a feminist perspective.64 While the Israeli government pressures the
Sharī‘a courts to modernize by diversifying its bench,65 it permits the Rabbinical courts to retain
exclusive jurisdiction over Jewish marriage and divorce, and women are still not allowed to serve
as judges, or dayanim, in Jewish religious courts.66 On the other hand, and perhaps a bit less
cynically, the appointment of Israel’s first female qadi illustrates what many scholars of plural
legal systems have noted for some time, which is that religious courts in plural legal systems “often
accommodate both substantive and procedural secular norms,”67 even when primarily relying on
interpretations of religious law.68 In this view, the change in position of the Sharī‘a courts
represents an evolving and “continuous legal and political negotiation[] game between the state
and its Muslim jurists.”69

Finally, it is important to note that Israeli feminists supported the annulment remedy to solve the
agunah problem and the appointment of Israel’s first female qadi to the Sharī‘a court. As these
two examples demonstrate, religious courts and law in Israel have been involved in the
liberalization of family law in Israel to a greater extent than is often acknowledged.

Lessons Learned
What lessons can be drawn from the Israeli experience for developing both practical approaches
and theoretical frameworks that would facilitate feminist/queer/religious convergences around the
regulation of families? Here, I am particularly interested in insights relevant to the United States
context.
12
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Nonmarital partnerships are not a threat to marriage
The first, I would suggest, is the lesson that legal recognition of nonmarital partnerships does not
have to be understood as a threat to the institution of marriage. Instead, the availability of
alternative legal frameworks for adult partnerships can be conceptualized as preserving the
religious, traditional meaning of marriage. In Israel, the maintenance of religious law in matters of
marriage and divorce is considered a basic tenet of the country’s polity—a legal system necessary
for the maintenance of the country as a Jewish state. For the majority Jewish population of the
country, then, marriage workarounds such as the reputed spouses doctrine represent a compromise
between the religious and secular segments of Israeli society furthering a shared national purpose
to preserve Israel as a Jewish state. That is, although marriage workarounds in Israel functionally
deliver essentially all the rights of marriage, their purpose is mainly to enable the continuation of
the religious monopoly over marriage.70

The political context in the United States is different. Yet reformers and civil rights lawyers in the
United States might find certain benefits to embracing a similar framework in their rhetoric and
legal strategies. Promoting rights for nonmarital cohabitants as something other than marriage is
likely to be attractive to progressives and religious constituencies alike. As many critical family
law scholars have observed, all adult partners do not wish to be married.71 Marriage brings with it
a staggering number of legal consequences as well as normative status. While many individuals
wish for these legal and expressional consequences, many do not. Many are offended by
marriage’s gendered, racist, heteronormative past and its rigid expectations of gender and sexual
expression.72 Marriage is also rooted in religious meaning that secular people may not wish to
ascribe. Others may desire to remain economically independent to protect their limited assets for
13
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themselves or their children from other relationships.73 Framing legal rights for nonmarried
partners as something entirely different from marriage would also be more acceptable to Christian
Americans who believe marriage is a sacred institution that deserves a special, elevated status in
American society.

Moreover, as a practical matter, the understanding that marriage alternatives are not marriage
seems essential to any serious move to secure legal recognition for nonmarital partners in the
United States. Many state lawmakers and judges in the United States are reluctant to equate
marriage and nonmarriage. For example, as recently as 2016, the Illinois Supreme Court refused
to recognize legal claims to enforce a contract because the parties were cohabitants.74 The court
emphasized the state’s continuing interest in distinguishing between marital and nonmarital
relationships. Even in states recognizing legal remedies for nonmarital cohabitants when their
relationships dissolve, courts are often reluctant to award relief due to a desire to preserve
marriage.75 If marriage alternatives—whether they be domestic partnerships, contracts that the
parties tailor to their particular circumstances, or post hoc remedies—were limited in scope or
customizable and conceptualized as true alternatives, lawmakers and judges may be more willing
to afford rights to unmarried couples, at least to mitigate the harshest injustices of the legal erasure
of nonmarital relationships. Winning some rights could, in turn, promote opportunities for new
meanings of family and intimacy within the law without forcing nonmarried families to assimilate
into a heteronormative, white, middle-class marital model.76

Finally, this approach might be achievable through the democratic process without resorting to
constitutional equal protection litigation because it rests on a framework of legal pluralism rather
14
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than nonmarriage equality per se. And if the Supreme Court were to take up such a case, the
conservative justices might be more willing to find an equal protection violation if the claims were
framed as a limited, incremental effort to gain specific rights rather than a wholesale design to gain
all the rights and benefits of marriage for nonmarried people. Or perhaps there could be targeted
litigation that, in turn, helps to build a larger movement for nonmarital partnership rights in the
long run. In any case, strategically approaching the question of nonmarital partnership rights as a
pragmatic, legal necessity that preserves the privileged status of religious marriage—rather than
an expression of idealized status or equality—is arguably a queer and feminist project. In this way,
the United States could learn from the Israeli approach.

Incentivizing Internal Religious Reforms

As the case of Israel’s Jewish religious annulments and first female qadi demonstrate, under the
right conditions, progressive, queer, and feminist approaches to the family may emerge from
within religious communities and institutions. In the face of sustained pressure from civil legal
institutions, religious leaders may come to see the negative human rights dimensions of their
doctrines and practices on their members and be willing to make sensible concessions to modern,
secular, civil norms. Scholars of multiculturalism, law, and religion, such as Ayelet Shachar,
Yüksel Sezgin, and Daphna Hacker, have observed that concessions by religious authorities are
most likely to occur under conditions of institutional competition.77 As discussed in this chapter,
Israel’s personal status system reflects this type of competition, because it formally maintains
religious and civil laws and courts with overlapping jurisdiction in its legal system; this creates
competition for legal authority and litigants. Such institutional competition is not formally present
15
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in the United States, as the First Amendment protects the autonomy of religious institutions such
as churches and synagogues vis-à-vis the state.78 Yet even religious institutions that operate in
secular democratic states are not immune from criticism and pressures to reforms by secular
society. In response to such pressures, they may, to varying degrees, adopt the strategy of selfreform to maintain legitimacy and retain members.79 The question for queer and feminist family
law reformers in the United States, then, is how to generate this pressure.

Negative publicity certainly helps, as when the media reported that the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints (formerly, the “Mormon Church”) played a central role in funding and
supporting a ballot measure in California outlawing same-sex marriage.80 Subsequently, the
Church engaged in a series of negotiations with leaders of Utah’s LGBTQ community that led to
the passage of housing and employment nondiscrimination laws protecting LGBTQ people in the
state.81 As Bill Eskridge has persuasively argued, the Church’s theology already contained certain
strands consistent with the nondiscrimination bill.82 Still, the public relations aspect of legislation’s
passage cannot be ignored, especially considering the LDS Church’s global missionary orientation.

Strategic litigation may also persuade religious authorities to reconsider their discriminatory
theologies. Revisiting the Utah example, it is notable that the housing and employment
nondiscrimination laws covering sexual orientation and gender identity were negotiated and passed
just as the state’s ban on same-sex marriage was being challenged in the federal district court.83
The two-track approach—conceding equality for LGBTQ+ individuals in housing and
employment with exemptions for religious objectors, while seeking to hold the line on
heterosexual marriage—is the paradigmatic example of how religious institutions may undergo
16
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self-reform in the face of pressure from civil, secular society. As many law and religion scholars
have observed, religious institutions in both secular and quasi-secular states do not operate in a
vacuum; they are in a dialectical relationship with the legal framework in which they operate. In
practice, they often embrace, or at least accede, to secular norms, even if primarily justifying their
transformation through religious doctrine.84 That it, convergences are most often the result of
power dynamics, not a pure meeting of the minds.

However, given the Supreme Court’s recent capture by the conservative Christian movement, one
challenge is that civil rights litigation may currently be an unrealistic source of secular pressure.
In the battle between religious freedom and equality, a majority of the Court has taken the side of
religion. These justices seem set on reconfiguring the First and Fourteenth Amendments in ways
that substantially expand religious freedom in American society at the cost of equality. Therefore,
in addition to civil rights litigation, it may be a good time for progressive family reformers in the
United States to consider approaches that have been successful in countries without robust
constitutional protections for individual rights, such as Israel.

Toward this end, advocates for family pluralism might consider ways to encourage and develop
what scholars of plural legal systems refer to as “informal pluralism,” that is, “situation[s] where
the state and non-state normative orderings—each with a different source of content legitimacy—
coexist within the same socio-legal space.”85 For example, taking a page from the Center for
Women’s Justice in Israel, which convened a private rabbinical court to hear Zvia Gordetsky’s
divorce case, could queer and feminist communities in the United States develop their own legal
system? Imagine a private court staffed by a “bench” of queer and feminist judges to hear
17
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separation, custody, or parentage disputes of LGBTQ+ and other nonnormative families, who
might have an interest in opting into such a system. When one considers the robust respect that
private arbitration agreements receive under United States law,86 this idea is not beyond the pale.87
A detailed discussion of how to institutionalize an alternative legal system for the queer and
feminist communities is beyond the scope of this chapter, but the larger point is that critical family
lawyers in the United States might look to Israel and other plural legal systems for inspiration in
developing “rival normative orderings”88 to circumvent conservative religious values that have
begun to overtake American constitutional and family law.

Conclusion
Due to the rise in power of the Christian Right, the United States is experiencing a period of
retrenchment, even cruelty,89 when it comes to the family rights of women and LGBTQ+ people.
Americans are often doubtful that we have anything to learn from other countries, especially those
we consider to be less democratic. Israel has developed a set of legal and political solutions to the
conflicts about the role of religion in family law. While not by any means perfect, the Israeli
experience suggests that progress may still be achieved in an unfavorable legal environment.
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blatantly discriminatory regime. . . .”).
25
Yefet (2009, 446).
26
These exceptions mainly pertain to repulsive bodily conditions such as halitosis or impotence. Riskin (2002,
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Committee to start a process to locate women to serve as qadis in the Sharī‘a courts. Zahalka (2017, 7); Haseisi (2015,
5). In 2015, Knesset member Issawi Frej, of the Meretz party, introduced a bill requiring at least one female nominee
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judges were women, finding that female judges imposed significantly lighter sentences than male judges), with
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that things don’t happen overnight. . . .These are long-term processes. After all, look at how long it took for me to
get this appointment.”).
64
According to Professor Abou Ramadan, Sharī‘a Courts in Israel enjoy unprecedented centrality within the
Islamic religious field, are subordinated to Israeli legislation, and are constituted of qadis that are appointed by a
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Antognini (2021).
Of note, something like this approach is presently afoot in the form of the Uniform Law Commission’s
proposed Uniform Cohabitants’ Economic Remedies Act (UCERA), a model law for states to adopt that provides a
mechanism to address the division of cohabitants’ property interests when the cohabitation ends. The Act is limited in
scope and does not create any special status for cohabitants. UNIFORM COHABITANTS’ ECONOMIC REMEDIES ACT,
Prefatory Note, at 1 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2021), https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/communityhome?CommunityKey=c5b72926-53d2-49f4-907c-a1cba9cc56f5
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agreements and training religious legal experts in their own religious laws to decide disputes. Broyde (2017). An
example of such an agreement and legal framework can be found at Beth Din of America, www.theprenup.org.
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